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A thousand miles across the South China Sea from West or Peninsular Malaysia,
the state of Sabah in the East enjoys a thriving telemovie industry that exists
independently from filmmaking on the Peninsular side. Sold in the markets in
video-CD format rather than made for television, homegrown telemovies
made in Malay and local languages and dealing with local issues have become
a highly popular entertainment medium in urban and rural Sabah ever since
Orang Kita (Our People), the first to be made, was released in 2002. Orang
Kita was a runaway success in Sabah, where it was most popular. It sold an
impressive 35,000 copies and triggered a whole series of new titles released
over the years (Abu Bakar Ellah 2009). Approximately forty to fifty telemovies
have been produced to date, thirty of which by Skyline/Skylaser Enterprise,
Sabah’s biggest telemovie production company. Aside from Orang Kita,
popular titles include Orang Kita 2 (2006), PTI: Percintaan Tanpa Izin (Love
Without Permission; 2005), and PTI 2 (2008). The telemovie explosion in
Sabah has also increased the popularity of local celebrities such as Abu Bakar
Ellah, Mat Kongo and Ela Sabah who are almost household names in the state.
Sabah’s telemovies have relatively straightforward storylines. All are made
on tight budgets and rely on small casts and limited equipment and technol -
ogies. In terms of production value, they are discernibly much less polished
than telemovies made for terrestrial or cable television, including Malay
telemovies aired on Malaysian channels. In PTI, for instance, viewers can even
spot the cardioid microphone peeking out from the top of the screen to capture
dialogues between characters; while in Orang Kita, toilet humour frowned
upon by the highbrow is used liberally. Such production shortcomings do 
not, however, detract from the value of local telemovies as appreciated by at
least a majority of the target audience, namely the general populace of Sabah,
encompassing the indigenous groups (such as the Kadazandusun, Murut 
and Bajau), the Malay and Chinese, as well as (illegal and legal) immigrants,
especially from the Philippines. Clearly, for these viewers, the attraction of
Sabah’s telemovies does not rest solely on standard production values; other
variables matter too, including their regard for participatory values, social
integration, diversity, truth-telling and fairness (Mulgan 1990).
As we shall see, these aforementioned qualities derive primarily from the
unique treatment of social alterity in Sabah and Sabah’s telemovies. Orang
Kita, PTI, Sabahan society and indeed East Malaysia are generally free from
Peninsular strictures. Ethnicity, religion and nationality are for the most part 
a non-issue in the telemovies, as for the thirty-two officially recognized ethnic
groups coexisting in Sabah. Sabahan identities are and have been historically
fluid and shifting in ways unthinkable in the Peninsula where ethnic and
religious boundaries are thick and policed. In Sabah, a Kadazan in one district
could self-identify as a Dusun in the next district and a Murut in yet another.
Similarly, a Malay(-Muslim) immigrant today could by volition switch identity
to being a local Bajau without raising an eyebrow, let alone cause a politico-
religious uproar on a national scale, as such a conversion would in the
Peninsula.
It is often said that Sabah’s fluid multiculturalism and non-racial openness
to difference offer a model of interethnic harmony that West Malaysia would
do well to emulate. Not mentioned as frequently is how these same qualities
also put Sabah at a relative disadvantage when engaging the three bangsa from
the Peninsula on the federal and political levels. Bangsa is a Malay term which
is typically taken to signify ethnicity, race or people but is redefined in this
chapter as a historically-shaped social, political and economic power-bloc
which, although ethnic-centred, is not a status that all ethnic groups attain.
Sabah, too, has some indigenous equivalent of bangsa in the typical sense of
the term but it never developed into a social, political and economic power-
bloc that the Malays, Chinese and Indians in West Malaysia have respectively
become.
Threading the discussion through Orang Kita and PTI as anchor films, this
chapter examines the evolution of Sabahan nationalist conceptions of ‘our
people’ as attempts to create a bangsa that is able to engage the three bangsa
from the Peninsula on equal political footing. It demonstrates how Orang 
Kita and PTI visualize what I describe as the third generation conception of
‘our people’, or ‘nationalism 3.0’ in short. Although nationalism 3.0 does not
yet exist as an organized political movement, and may never in future, it is
already present today on the ground in Sabah as a developing ideal and a
sentiment that is gaining popularity. Orang Kita and PTI are testament to this,
as to the interventionist role of film in Sabahan society.
Orang Kita and attitudes towards alterity in Sabah
Shot in the Malay language, Orang Kita is a comedic drama revolving around
Ampal, a country yokel who has never ventured beyond his kampung (village)
in the interior of Sabah. Played by Abu Bakar Ellah, who is also the director,
Ampal is a visually striking comic figure, not least because of the Penan upside-
down bowl haircut he sports. He is a river fisherman in his kampung, where
he finds it hard to make a living. He desires to move to Kota Kinabalu (KK),
the capital of Sabah, and find work there, imagining the city as a locus of
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opportunities beyond what a remote village could offer. Ampal’s chance
arrives when he crosses paths with and befriends Om, who frequently drives
between KK and the interior parts of Sabah where he delivers fresh vegetables
and other goods. Ampal asks Om (Mat Kongo) for help to get to the city and
find a job there, and the latter agrees without hesitation or artifice, even though
they barely know each other. That night, Ampal bids farewell to his girlfriend,
Sulima (Ela Sabah), who tearfully insists on coming along but is finally
placated by Ampal’s promise to send for her once he has found a job in the
city. The next morning Ampal goes to KK for the first time in Om’s mini-
lorry.
With the premise thus set, Orang Kita takes viewers through Ampal’s and
Om’s comic journey and misadventures in the city, and the former’s encounters
with urban modernity. Having never experienced the situation, Ampal is
amazed that everyone has to pay a fee to use the public toilets. He talks to the
vending machine, thinking that it holds a real person inside whose job is to
dispense canned drinks. He gawks at the elevator and escalator the first time
he uses them. He is simultaneously curious and afraid when he sees a toy car
driving itself near him, thinking it is animated by spirits. Ampal’s child-like
village naivety results in his being put in tight situations, such as when he and
Om are left with the bill after a man in the city invites them for a meal but
sneaks away after eating without paying. Orang Kita concludes when Ampal’s
love interest, Sulima, suddenly appears in the city with her father to ask him
to return to the village, the implication being that Sulima’s father, hitherto
against Ampal marrying his daughter, has had a change of heart and now
accepts him as a future son-in-law.
Orang Kita is sold without any subtitles but viewers who understand Malay
would easily be able to follow the simple plot and enjoy the film on the
universal level as a story about the search for a better life, the value of friend -
ship and the like. Viewers who are able to follow the film in this way but are
unfamiliar with Sabah’s complex social fabric are, however, likely to overlook
how Orang Kita signifies much more than might be apparent on the surface,
particularly where identity markers like ethnicity, religion and nationality are
concerned. For instance, Ampal, despite his Penan haircut, is not, as some
viewers might imagine, Penan, the aboriginal people found not in Sabah but
Sarawak (the other state in East Malaysia) and Brunei. From the signs provided
by the film and from contextual knowledge, it is clear that he is a non-Muslim
who belongs instead to the ‘land people’.
‘Land people’ generally inhabit the interior districts of Sabah, although some
live in the coastal districts as well. They traditionally engage in paddy and
shifting cultivation methods and are mainly animists, with some proportion of
them being Christians and Muslims (Roff 1974: 21–23). Historically, Dusun
and Murut were names given to ‘land people’ by the Muslim feudal lords
working within the Brunei sultanate, which once claimed suzerainty over
Sabah. British administrators used the same labels as a means of classification
after Sabah came under British rule in the 1880s. With the rise of the first wave
114 Hiroyuki Yamamoto
of nationalist sentiment in the 1950s, a group of ‘land people’, who were
officially categorized as Dusuns, proclaimed themselves to be Kadazan. In
1961, this growing emotion among the ‘land people’ led to a resolution by
state-wide Dusun leaders, stating that Dusuns should be called Kadazans.
Murut leaders declared a similar resolution for Muruts to be called Kadazans.
Thus the ‘land people’ officially came to be called Kadazans. When an identity
crisis occurred in the 1980s, regarding whether ‘land people’ should be called
Kadazans or Dusuns, the term Kadazan was officially changed to Kadazan -
dusun in 1989 (Topin 1995). The question of whether the Muruts were a part
of the Kadazandusun or a separate ethnic entity remained unresolved. Currently
the official term for ‘land people’ in Sabah is Kadazandusun but some use 
the term Kadazandusun-Murut or simply ‘KDM community’. Meanwhile, 
in the 1991 census, ‘land people’ were divided into several categories: Dusuns
(16.6 per cent of 1.3 million people, the total population of Sabah), Kadazans
(8.0 per cent), Muruts (3.8 per cent) and other indigenous groups. To avoid
complexity, this chapter refers to these groups as ‘land people’.
In contrast to the ‘indigenous’ Ampal whose character silently bears the
historical burden of the ‘land people’, Om is a Muslim of ‘sea people’
background. ‘Sea people’ generally live in the coastal districts of Sabah, tradi -
tionally engaged in trade and fishery, and profess Islam (Roff 1974: 23–24).
In the pre-colonial period, the former were subjects of the Muslim sultan-
ates of Brunei and Sulu. When Sabah came under British rule in the 1880s,
the state boundary for the colony of Sabah (then called North Borneo) was
demarcated and both sultanates became detached from the colony. This led
British administrators to believe that ‘sea people’ originated from outside of
Sabah. The ‘sea people’, therefore, became the immigrant population in Sabah
while the ‘land people’ were thought to be indigenous. ‘Sea people’ became
classified in Sabah as Bajaus, Bruneis, Suluks and other ethnic groups. ‘Sea
people’ with Malaysian citizenship were subsequently recognized as also
indigenous to Sabah, and their ‘native’ status was recognized along with the
‘land people’. Perception of indigenousness became confusing again when
Sabah gained its independence in 1963, becoming a state in the Federation of
Malaysia. Then, the ‘land people’ claimed to be indigenous people of Sabah,
while the ‘sea people’ claimed they were indigenous to Malaysia where Malay
Muslims are recognized to have the privilege of being ‘native.’ In the 1991
census, ‘sea people’ were counted as Bajaus (16.3 per cent), Malays (8.1 per
cent), and other indigenous groups.
Because of their entangled histories, ‘land people’ and ‘sea people’ of Sabah
are often thought to be mutual rivals. From this standpoint, Ampal and 
Om should not be mingling, let alone become good friends, were it not for the
reality at grass-roots level that ‘land people’ and ‘sea people’ have never
developed their communities exclusively of each other. The two groups in fact
have long been dependent on each other in many aspects of their social life,
as Ampal’s and Om’s relationship in Orang Kita intimates. In spite of their
ethnic and religious differences – differences which are neither underlined 
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nor made an issue in the telemovie – the two characters become mates, con -
stantly poking fun at each other in good humour. Driving Ampal to KK for
the first time, for instance, Om makes a rest stop at a place overlooking 
Mount Kinabalu, Sabah’s most famous tourist destination, which was made a
UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2000. Ampal’s ignorance of Mount Kinabalu
prompts Om to lecture the former, emphasising that every citizen of Sabah
ought to be knowledgeable about the iconic mountain, unless they want to 
be laughed at by foreign tourists. This might seem like an insult to Ampal by
those who hold that ‘land people’ are indigenous to Sabah and the ‘sea people’
are immigrants. However, in Orang Kita, Om’s lecture is neither insulting in
intent nor taken as an insult by Ampal. Throughout the film, Om and Ampal
constantly jibe at each other without either party taking offence. When Om
has to make an emergency stop on the way to KK so that he could relieve
himself in the bush, Ampal cheekily fiddles with Om’s mini lorry and gives
Om a fright when he almost speeds off (despite not knowing how to drive) on
his own, forcing Om to scramble after him before giving Ampal an earful.
Subsequently, in the city, when Om buys halal (kosher) ‘chicken rice’ for both
himself and Ampal, the latter half-feigns confusion to poke fun at Om, saying
that he does not want to consume food meant for chicken.
In Orang Kita, as in Sabah, differences in ethnicity and religion rarely if
ever lead to the creation of insurmountable barriers or give rise to tensions
and animosity, as they have the potential to in Peninsular Malaysia. This
remains true even after 1991 when the United Malays National Organisation
(UMNO), the Peninsula-based Malay-Muslim political party, brought its brand
of racial and religious politics into Sabah. By no means does this imply that 
ethnic and religious tensions are entirely absent in Sabah. Indeed, as Fausto
Barlocco contends, some Kadazans in Sabah bear an expressed disdain for the
Malazu (Malay in Kadazan) whose monoracial TV dramas originating from
the Penin sula are rejected and identified, ‘often unconsciously’, as propaganda
that promotes ‘a national culture based on Malay and Islamic values’ (Barlocco
2009). None of this, however, detracts from the reality that ethnicity, religion
and even the country of origin or nationality generally play a negligible role
in Sabahan social life.
Sabahan society is generally open to difference in ways that go far beyond
‘tolerance’ practised between a majority of the Malays, Chinese and Indians
in the Peninsula. This is certainly fortunate, considering that, in comparison
to the Peninsula, Sabahan society is much more diverse, mixed and fluid 
as a result of higher numbers of marriages across ethnicity and religion, as
well as migration from Kalimantan, Sulawesi and the Philippines. Leaving
aside the slapstick humour, the conviviality and affection demonstrated
between Ampal and Om despite their different backgrounds, for instance, suit -
ably exempli fies the spirit of mutual acceptance that characterizes Sabah’s
social life. It is an acceptance that is neither affected nor forced but spontan-
eous and emphatic. Their symbolic bond could only strengthen, as suggested
by Orang Kita 2. In the sequel, while travelling together with Ampal, Om is
116 Hiroyuki Yamamoto
mistaken for someone else and is arrested and jailed by the local police. Ampal
stands by his friend and ends up waiting a long time before Om is released.
A subplot in Orang Kita involving Ampal and Sulima as cross-boundary
lovers provides another illustration of what the typical West Malaysian psyche
would regard as a problem of otherness but is literally a non-issue for a majority
of Sabahans. In several scenes, Sulima wears baju kurung, while her father is
seen in one wearing kain sarung, both being traditional outfits for Malay-
Muslim women and men respectively. That they dress like Malay-Muslims
does not in itself signify that they are Malay-Muslims as it is common in Sabah
for both Muslims and non-Muslims to wear similar clothing. In one scene,
Sulima’s father (who earlier rejected Ampal as his daughter’s suitor) confides
in Sulima that he is growing old and wants to bertaubat by going clean 
and giving up the ‘sinful’ (black magic) work he had been doing. The term
bertaubat in Malay can mean either ‘to repent’ or ‘to be converted’ into 
Islam, which, again, leaves the question of the father’s religion unanswered.
The next time Sulima’s father appears, he wears a black songkok (male
Muslim headgear), explaining to his daughter that he had just returned from
surau (a small mosque). This confirms finally that Sulima’s father is henceforth
a Muslim, irrespective of whether he was previously a non-Muslim or a
lapsed Muslim.
Assuming that Sulima, too, has always been a Muslim, or becomes one 
in practice like her father, then, Ampal too would have to convert to Islam by
law before he could marry Sulima. In Orang Kita, however, the issue of
religious conversion is not taken up at all simply because marriages across
ethnicity and religion are commonplace in Sabah. It is not unusual for East
Malaysians to have Christian, Buddhist, Muslim and animist relatives,
sometimes staying under the same roof. As Sabahan journalist, Erna Mahyuni
(2010), writes, the common reaction upon receiving news that someone is
marrying a person from another religion or ethnicity is: ‘“Oh, your kids will
be cute!” No heated discussion about traditions and religious differences
because the unspoken assumption is that the couple will work them out.’ The
hybrid fluidity of identities in Sabah can be unsettling to the typical West
Malaysian psyche, which is accustomed to racially categorizing Malaysians
as Malay, Chinese, Indian or ‘other races’. Erna notes, ‘I have met West
Malaysians who get very agitated when I refuse to tell them either what religion
I profess or what race I am. They don’t know what to do with me because they
can’t categorise me.’
Bangsa and the first two waves of Sabahan nationalism
Sabah’s unique openness to difference, as intimated by Orang Kita, is due in
no small measure to the fact that clear-cut ethnic and religious boundaries were
never developed in Sabah by the British colonial administration (Ongkili 1972:
1; Lee 1976: 14). Furthermore, when Sabah became part of the Federation 
of Malaysia in 1963, it was recognized as having special privileges and state
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administrative independence. Sabah has control over its immigration system
and anyone who is not from Sabah, regardless of whether the person is a
Malaysian citizen or not, needs to obtain a work permit from the state to be
employable in Sabah. This unique system explains how Sabah was able 
to remain relatively free from interference from the federal government in
Peninsular Malaysia until recent decades. Sabah’s independent trajectory 
is in radical contrast to West Malaysia which has evolved a system of bangsa.
Bangsa is a Malay term commonly employed to denote ethnicity, race or people
(Ariffin 1993: 14–21; Milner 1994: 50–54). In this discussion, however, 
I define and demonstrate bangsa as primarily a social, political and economic
power-bloc which, although culture-centred, not all cultural groups are privi -
leged to become.
This qualified notion of bangsa has its roots in Malaya, where its application
today dominates the political imaginary in the Peninsula. During British rule,
the multiethnicities in Malaya had to fit into one of the politically recognized
bangsa (Malay, Chinese, Indian) if they were to be recognized as qualifying
for certain rights. Marriages across these divides gradually reduced and 
over time the boundaries separating the bangsa became thicker. Subsequently
there emerged movements among the people of Malaya to mobilize bangsa
to uplift their own group status, which resulted in the emergence of bangsa-
based political parties. The United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) 
was formed in 1946, the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) in the same year,
and the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) in 1949. These three parties
formed an election coalition that won the federal council elections in 1955,
two years before Malayan independence. Since then, the administration of
Malaya and later Malaysia has been under the control of a coalition of ethnic
parties, with UMNO, MCA, and MIC as its central core. Through this pro-
cess, it could be said that the three ethnic groups came to be recognized by
each other as qualified to form political parties and to send representatives 
to the federal government, and to discuss and make decisions on issues at 
the national level. Under this system, every bangsa is an ethnic group but not 
all ethnic groups constitute a bangsa each. Ethnic groups in Malaysia not
recognized as bangsa include Orang Asli, Thais, Portuguese, Baba/Nyonya,
and so on. They do not possess their own cultural institutions, unlike the three
recognized major bangsa, each of which possesses its own state-recognized
mother-tongue (actively used in newspapers, radio, TV, schools and so on),
cultural holidays and political party.
The above-described bangsa system of West Malaysia is alien to Sabah first
because, as signalled earlier, the British never installed it in the state; and
second, because bangsa-based political parties from West Malaysia did not
spread their wings to Sabah upon the formation of Malaysia. The British
broadly categorized the people of Sabah as indigenous groups, coastal Muslims
and the Chinese. The indigenous groups mostly comprised non-Muslims who
shared similar cultural characteristics among themselves, such as language and
beliefs. They did not have a single, unified collective identity; rather, they
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identified themselves differently from district to district but they were generally
called Dusuns by the Brunei Muslims, who had been ruling a part of the region
before the British arrived. Dusun, which in Malay means ‘the people of the
orchard’, was the official name the British gave the indigenous groups of Sabah
when they ruled the region in the late nineteenth century. As outlined earlier,
the Dusun subsequently became politicized and evolved into Kadazan and later
Kadazandusun or Kadazandusun-Murut (KDM).
That the bangsa system is absent from Sabah might be seen as a blessing
insofar as it prevented a potential repeat of the deep racial polarization caused
by the entrenched system in the Peninsula. Its absence is, however, a major
political disadvantage for the indigenous people of Sabah since, as previously
underscored, attainment of bangsa status is necessary to engage the three
bangsa of the Peninsula on equal terms at the federal level. This is particu-
larly true from the 1980s onward, when Sabah could no longer expect large
revenues from its timber industry. Changing political circumstances meant 
that Sabah could no longer afford to be concerned only with its internal affairs,
forced as it has been since to review its position in the context of national
Malaysian politics, and even its treatment towards immigrant populations 
from neighbour ing countries, as we shall see in the subsequent discussion of
the telemovie, PTI.
In response to such internal and external pressures, a group of ‘land 
people’ launched its first wave of Sabahan nationalism in the 1950s based on
lineage or indigeneity (Roff 1974; Luping 1994: 97–105; Yamamoto 2002:
216–219). The prime movers were from Penampang, a west coast district of
Sabah. Historically, the local people of Penampang were subjected to the
Brunei sultanate and were called Dusun, which, although literally means
‘people of the orchard’, connotes yokels. They were also exposed to the English
language, Christianity and the West earlier than most parts of Sabah by a
Catholic missionary group settling in the area during the early stages of British
colonization. The missionaries subsequently standardized the indigenous
language of Sabah, which led to the development of Kadazan consciousness
and nationalism. This, as signalled earlier, awakened the Dusun to push for a
renaming and reunification of the indigenous people under the term Kadazan,
the supposedly long-forgotten name for the ‘land people’ of Sabah then called
Dusun, although the understanding of this was shared only among those in the
Penampang and surrounding regions.
The first wave of Sabahan ‘land people’ nationalism was successful insofar
as it managed to bring about a sense of self-reliance among the Kadazans, and
to install the president of the Kadazan-based political party, the United National
Kadazan Organisation (UNKO; later United National Pasok-Momogun
Kadazan Organisation or UPKO), as Chief Minister of Sabah in 1963 when
Malaysia was formed. The explosive growth of Kadazan nationalism, however,
caused uncertainty among the mostly-Muslim ‘sea people’ who felt excluded
from Sabahan state affairs. They also felt that Kadazan nationalism, which was
interwoven with aspects of Christianity and the English language, promoted
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an image of anti-Islam and anti-Malay language. As a result, although
Kadazanism thrived initially, it soon faced strong opposition from Sabah as
well as from the Malay-Muslims in Peninsular Malaysia. UPKO was dissolved
following the party’s loss in the state general elections of 1967, supplanted by
the Muslim-based party, United Sabah National Organisation (USNO). Many
‘land people’ who identified themselves as Dusun, some of which converted
to Islam, then joined USNO, siding with the ‘sea people’ to run the state. The
Kadazans, as a distinctive political power, were no longer seen in the arena
of state politics in Sabah, although many ‘land people’ took part in state
administration.
A second tide of Sabahan nationalism to obtain bangsa status, again initiated
by the ‘land people’, emerged in the 1980s when the people began criticiz-
ing the state government, arguing that Sabah’s economic development had 
failed to benefit the common people of Sabah. Indigenous nationalists of the
second tide aimed to uplift the position of Sabah in Malaysia and demanded
that Sabah be treated as an equal partner with other states in the Federation 
of Malaysia (Luping 1994: 428–438; Yamamoto 2002: 219–222). Instead of
basing their claims to rights based on lineage or indigeneity, they employed
the concept of nationalism based on regionality. This was a move calculated
to overcome the limitations of the first wave of nationalism in the 1950s which,
in emphasizing Kadazanism, alienated the non-Kadazans. Led by a group 
of mostly-Christian ‘land people’ from Tambunan, an interior region of Sabah,
the movement gradually gained momentum.1 When the Tambunan group
formed the Sabah United Party (PBS) in 1985, it attracted members from all
corners of Sabah, including ‘land people’, ‘sea people’ and the Chinese. The
multi-ethnic PBS often employed the slogan ‘Sabah for Sabahan’ in its struggle
to unite Sabahans and to forge a common identity among them so that they
could be recognized as a bangsa. Well supported by Sabahans, PBS won four
successive state general elections from 1985 onwards.
At the same time that a pan-Sabahan identity was being forged, the
Tambunan leadership, through the Kadazan Cultural Association, also pur-
sued the goal of revitalizing Kadazan culture and identity. It resolved the 
naming dispute between ‘land people’ who saw themselves as either Kadazan
or Dusun by renaming the people as Kadazandusun (KD), resulting in their
relative reintegration. The successful revitalization of the Kadazandusun
identity, however, served to weaken the integration between the ‘land people’
and other groups in Sabah, leading to the demise of the Sabahan state
administration under PBS. It alienated the ‘sea people’ who saw the Tambunan
leadership as being pro-Christianity, driving them to seek closer relations 
with Malay-Muslims in the Peninsula. Amidst conflict between the Sabah 
state government and the federal government, UMNO entered Sabah in 1991
and set up branches. A group of ‘sea people’ left PBS to join UMNO, while
other splinters formed Chinese- and Kadazandusun-based parties. After staying
on as the opposition, PBS was co-opted in 2003 into Barisan Nasional (BN),
the national front led by UMNO. PBS remains multi-ethnic like other local
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political parties in Sabah, but is regarded as a Kadazandusun party within the
BN framework.
As a result of its struggles over the decades, the KDM community today
has had some of its key cultural festivals marked as national holidays, as well
as its own Kadazan newspapers and radio programmes. The KDM mother
tongue is also now taught in schools in Sabah. These developments suggest
that Kadazandusuns are making progress in their struggle to attain bangsa
status, although the key point remains that they have yet to attain it insofar as
they still lack full bangsa representation at the national level.
Nationalism 3.0 and PTI
Having sketched the evolution of indigenous identities and attitudes towards
ethnic, religious and other similarities/differences in Sabah vis-à-vis the
Peninsula, I want to now examine the ways in which Sabah’s telemovies like
Orang Kita, PTI: Percintaan Tanpa Izin and their sequels envision what I posit
as an emergent third generation indigenous Sabahan nationalism, or Sabahan
‘nationalism 3.0’. Nationalism 3.0 as I define it here does not yet exist as an
organized political movement; nor is there any guarantee that it will. It exists
at present as a developing ideal and a sentiment that is gaining popularity in
Sabah, as I observed in my six years of fieldwork there.
This qualified emergent third generation of Sabahan nationalism is
distinguishable from the first in that it eschews indigeneity as a precondition
for inclusion in the construction of bangsa Sabah. It shares with the second
generation the regional emphasis but adds a crucial twist. In 3.0, ‘our people’
is framed as an inclusive category that does not discriminate on the basis of
ethnicity, religion, class or origin (whether one is a Sabah-born or foreign-
born citizen, or a citizen or an immigrant). The only condition for inclusion
in good faith, as intimated in Orang Kita and developed in PTI, is that one
should enter and reside in Sabah legally, and, at the same time, recognize the
rest of ‘our people’ in Sabah as partners in life, as exemplified, for instance,
by Ampal’s and Om’s friendship.
Abu Bakar Ellah and Mat Kongo who play Ampal and Om in Orang Kita
return in PTI to play different characters but remaining on one level the
respective representatives of their ‘people’. The former takes on the role of
Angkon, one of the ‘land people’ living in Kudat in northern Sabah, while the
latter plays Otok, a Muslim of ‘sea people’ background who has acquired
Malaysian citizenship after living in Sabah for an extended period as an
immigrant from a neighbouring country. PTI, though, is not so much about
Angkon and Otok as it is about their respective daughter and nephew, Clarice
and Den. Strangers who become friends and lovers, Clarice and Den enter into
a relationship that cuts across class, ethnic, religion and state boundaries in a
way that would raise eyebrows in West Malaysia. Clarice is a high-school
teacher from a middle-class background, while Den is a labourer who sells
vegetables and fruits at a market in Kudat. Clarice’s father is non-Muslim,
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which makes Clarice more likely to be non-Muslim, too, taking into account
the norm for the majority of ‘land people’ in Sabah. Den, on the other hand,
is a Muslim of ‘sea people’ background.
In line with the inclusive philosophy of the third wave of Sabahan
nationalism, PTI makes no issue of ethnic, religious or even class differ-
ence, raising as its sole concern Den’s status as a PTI, which in Malay denotes
pendatang tanpa izin or ‘illegal immigrant’.2 A homographic pun on PTI 
as the acronym is commonly understood, the title of the telemovie, PTI:
Percintaan Tanpa Izin (Love Without Permission) describes Clarice’s and
Den’s relationship – one that is ‘unauthorized’ because Den has no legal
standing to reside in Sabah, be it temporarily or permanently. From the ethical
perspective of the film narrative, nothing, apart from Den’s PTI status, stands
in the way of Clarice and Den developing their relationship and perhaps 
even getting married some day, not even the fact that Clarice’s hand in
marriage has already been promised to someone else. PTI reveals in a subplot
how, in order to unite their land and continue to work together, Clarice’s father,
Angkon, had in the distant past made a friendship pact with his now-deceased
Muslim friend to have their children marry each other when they reach
adulthood. As Angkon says to his friend in a flashback, ‘a friend is a friend
even if he is from another ethnicity and religion. This (way of life) is our
inheritance from our forefathers.’
Years later, Angkon, faithful to the pact, invites his friend’s son, Rudy, 
to get to know Clarice with the intention of seeing them married in the near 
future, unaware that Rudy is already engaged to Lydia, who is furthermore
pregnant. That Clarice is non-Muslim while Rudy is Muslim is hardly a factor
in Clarice’s decision to not to marry Rudy. Rudy’s status as a Muslim is in
fact a potential solution to the unhappy love triangle. As Rudy proposes, he
could fulfil his duty by marrying both Lydia and Clarice since he is allowed
to have up to four wives in Islamic law. Clarice could not take up the offer
simply because she finally realizes that her heart already belongs to Den. 
Her realization comes a little too late, however. As she returns to the remote
island of Banggi from Kudat after conveying her decision to her family and
Rudy, Den is already leaving the pier on a boat heading to his hometown in
a neighbouring country. He is forced to leave Sabah by Otok, his uncle, who
is concerned for Den’s safety as the Malaysian authorities are in the midst of
an operation to mass-arrest illegal immigrants in Sabah.
PTI ends ‘unhappily’ with the lovers thus separated, prevented from uniting
despite transcending ethnicity, religion and class. Den simply could not be
absorbed as ‘our people’ in the conception of Sabahan nationalism 3.0 that
underlines PTI because he does not have the legal papers. Even Clarice tells
him so directly in a scene where immigrants, even illegal ones, are defended
and redignified, instead of stigmatized as they are likely to be in West Malaysia.
Mistakenly assuming that Clarice would not marry him because of his PTI
status, Den pleads, and I paraphrase, ‘Do PTIs have no feelings? Are we not
allowed to marry? Is it because PTIs are bad people, all thieves and robbers?’
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Clarice responds to this not by placating Den but by insisting that the laws 
of the country are such that PTIs cannot be allowed in Sabah. Only years 
later, in PTI2, does Den return to Sabah after clearing the legal hurdles. PTI2
revolves around Den’s return, his discovery that Clarice has married a wealthy
businessman and changed her name to Camila, and his attempts to rekindle
their love.
To better understand why the third generation of Sabahan nationalism
exemplified by PTI should insist that only legal immigrants be counted in 
its definition of ‘our people’, it is necessary to take into account the histor-
ical context and the urgency of the problem of illegal immigrants in Sabah 
today. Because of Sabah’s porous boundaries and geographical proximity to
the Philippines and Indonesia, movements of people from surrounding areas
into the state continued even after Sabah became part of Malaysia in 1963.
Broadly categorized as Filipinos and Indonesians, these immigrants include
Bajau, Suluk and other ‘sea people’. According to the 1991 census (Population
and Housing Census of Malaysia 1991: Table 1.3), residents of Sabah include
Indonesians (10.7 per cent) who rank as the second largest non-native ethnic
group after the Chinese (15.2 per cent). Filipinos (1.6 per cent) constitute the
third largest non-native ethnic group. These figures do not include foreigners
who entered Sabah without the proper documents and those who entered 
legally but become illegal when they failed to renew their work permits.
Because it is often difficult to distinguish by appearances only if a person is
a citizen, a legal immigrant, or a PTI in Sabah, PTIs have largely been able
to blend in and evade the authorities.
Sabah’s PTI problem falls under the jurisdiction of the federal government.
The Federal Special Task Force for Illegal Immigrants reported that 120,000
illegal immigrants were deported between 1990 and 1998. Out of these, 70
percent were from the Philippines, while the rest were from Indonesia. The
task force estimated there were some 100,000 illegal immigrants remaining
in Sabah when they completed their 1999 operation in the state, but the real
figures remain unknown. The current estimated Sabah population is about 
2.8 million while estimates of the number of illegal immigrant population 
range from 130,000 (‘Only’) and half a million to above 1 million (Sadiq 
2005: 107).
The moral and political attitude of PTI and Orang Kita towards immi-
grants in general and PTIs in particular is markedly sanguine in the face of
Sabah’s PTI problem. The telemovies remain inclusive in ways qualified
earlier, despite acknowledgement on the ground level that the problem has long
gone out of control. Sadiq (2005: 108) notes in his study that almost one in
three residents of Sabah is a foreigner (legal and illegal). In the coastal town
of Sandakan, the residents are ‘overwhelmingly Filipino, while Indonesians
com prise the majority of residents in Tawau’ (2005: 106).
What complicates the PTI problem in Sabah is that, as popularly believed
by Sabahans, illegal immigration into the state is not a ‘natural’ phenomenon
and is deliberately encouraged by certain sections within the Malaysian state
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dominated by UMNO (Kitingan 2006). Hundreds of thousands of mostly
Muslim immigrants have been given Malaysian citizenship (which includes
the right to vote) in order to alter Sabah’s demographics and increase UMNO’s
vote banks. A result of this has been the shrinkage of the size of the KDM
com munity. Constituting 49 percent of Sabah’s population in the early twen -
tieth century, Kadazandusuns were the majority ethnic group. ‘They fell to 
32 percent by the 1960 census, 29.9 percent by 1970, and then, to their alarm,
by 1990 they had fallen to 19.6 percent’ (Sadiq 2005: 108).
‘Our People’
That Orang Kita, PTI and their sequels remain steadfastly inclusive in their
shared conception of ‘our people’ at a time when the political map of Sabah
is being altered by illegal immigration might perhaps be construed as
insensitive to the plight of Sabah’s indigenous people gradually coming to 
be outnumbered by foreigners. Worse, by advocating a conception of ‘our
people’ that includes legal immigrants, the telemovies might be seen as being
unwittingly complicit in what many Sabahans regard as UMNO’s attempt to
hijack Sabah by flooding the state with mostly Muslim immigrants and
granting them citizenship at the expense of the mostly non-Muslim indigenous
citizens, many of whom ironically do not even possess the documented proof
of citizenship easily acquired by foreigners. Consider, however, an alternative
interpretation of the telemovies’ insistence on inclusivity over exclusivity.
What if it is precisely because (rather than in spite) of the severity of the
problem that the inclusive ideal becomes even more necessary and urgent? 
It bears underlining here that the telemovies do not pretend to offer direct
solutions to the PTI problem, just as they do not deny that practical solutions
ought to be found to tackle Sabah’s PTI problem in all its dimensions. What
it does offer, arguably, is an ideal, a long-term goal and a reminder to Sabahans
not to forget and neglect the inherited inclusive spirit of ‘our people’ while
attempting to resolve the immediate problem. Fixing the problem but losing
the spirit that makes Sabah unique relative to West Malaysia would only
ultimately amount to losing the war.
That Orang Kita, PTI and their sequels remain steadfastly inclusive despite
everything may not be unintended by their makers, including Abu Bakar Ellah
who plays Ampal and Angkon and directed and acted in these productions.
Although appearing ‘comical’ in his Penan hairstyle which he sports on and
off camera, Ellah is far from politically simple or naive, as demonstrated for
instance by his contesting in the 2004 general elections as an independent
candidate in the Kuamut state constituency deep in the interior of Sabah.
Quoted as saying, ‘Like in the movie, I am a humble man, a kampung [village]
boy who wishes to make a change’ (‘Singer’ 2004), Ellah stood against a candi -
date from Barisan Nasional, the race-centred coalition, and lost. He has since
decided to quit politics and focus on his entertainment career (‘Saya’ 2005)
124 Hiroyuki Yamamoto
but his productions such as Orang Kita and PTI remain a testament to attempts
by Sabahans to cast bangsa Sabah in the inclusive mould of 3.0.
Abu Bakar Ellah is a member of Orang Sungai or the ‘river people’, the
community into which he was born in 1959, which puts him in good stead to
filmically intervene in the construction of bangsa Sabah. ‘River people’
traditionally live along the Kinabatangan and other rivers on the eastern coast
of Sabah. Linguistically, they are categorized as a sub-group of the Kadazan -
dusuns but because the majority of them are Muslims, they are seen as an
exception among the Kadazandusuns. As the name suggests, ‘river people’
are in an ideal position to mediate between ‘land people’ and ‘sea people’
(including foreigners); they have built-in advantages with regard to the
momentum for dismantling and reshaping the dichotomies still existing
between ‘land people’ and ‘sea people’.
Abu Bakar Ellah’s most pointed intervention in the direction of 3.0, which
encapsulates the philosophy of Orang Kita and PTI, is the theme song from
the former telemovie, which I want to now examine by way of concluding the
discussion. A huge hit in Sabah, ‘Orang kita’ (Our people) was written by Abu
Bakar Ellah who is, apart from being a well-known actor, also an accomplished
popular singer with five albums released to date. Repeated multiple times in
the running time, part of the song reads as follows:
Makan pakai tangan To eat with fingers
Suka makan belacan Enjoy the taste of belacan
[shrimp paste]
Jumpa ucap salam And to say salam [greeting] when 
they meet
Adalah  . . . That is
Orang kita Our people
Pandai bikin tapai Good at making tapai
[fermented rice]
Suka ramai-ramai Getting together with a lot of people
Kadang ampai-ampai Being relaxed and going with the flow
Adalah . . . That is
Orang kita Our people
Orang kita . . . Our people
Jaga-jagalah budaya kita Uphold our culture
Orang kita . . . Our people
Jaga-jagalah budaya kita Uphold our culture
The song is reminder of the shared similarities between the different
communities that effectively make up ‘our people’. Eating with fingers is a
common local practice, as is relishing belacan (shrimp paste), a typical sauce
used in the Malay world, of which Sabah and Peninsular Malaysia are parts.
Salam is a salutation used between Malay-Muslims in Peninsular Malaysia;
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in Sabah, however, it is a common term used by ‘sea people’ and ‘land people’
regardless of their religion. Tapai is fermented rice and usually served as rice
wine. In Sabah, tapai is commonly thought of as an alcoholic beverage and
the traditional drink of the ‘land people’ who would on special occasions gather
and drink tapai through the night with nuts as nibbles. The mention of tapai
in the song would seem to exclude Muslims (for whom alcohol is forbidden)
but consider the lyrics, which say ‘making tapai’ instead of ‘drinking tapai.’
The tapai mentioned here could only be fermented rice paste. The paste-type
tapai is a snack commonly enjoyed by Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
Therefore, in a society like Sabah, where people from various backgrounds
frequently gather and share, ‘upholding our culture’ (as mentioned in the song)
does not mean distilling different cultural aspects but rather embracing the
various aspects of life as it is practised in Sabah.
The next part of the song reads:
Laksmana Hang Tuah Admiral Hang Tuah
Paduka Mat Salleh Noble Mat Salleh
Si Aki Antanom And great Antanom
Adalah . . . They are
Orang kita Our people
Orang kita . . . Our people
Ingat-ingat asal-usulnya Remember the origins
Orang kita . . . Our people
Ingat-ingat asal-usulnya Remember the origins
In the above section, three important names are invoked as a way of
‘remember[ing] our origins.’ Mat Salleh is known as the leader of a series of
rebellions in Sabah against the British from 1884 to 1900. He is the most
prominent anti-colonialist figure in Sabahan history and has long been regarded
as a Sabahan hero, although attempts have been made recently to reposition
Mat Salleh as a hero of the ‘sea people’ or as a Muslim hero for Sabah. As if
in response to this, the song invokes Antanom, another rebel leader who fought
against British rule in 1915 in the interior district of Rundum.3 Antanom
belongs to the Murut ethnic group and is known also for his unique hairstyle,
which Abu Bakar Ellah models. By placing Mat Salleh and Antanom together,
the song emphasizes inclusivity – that Sabah’s heroes come from various
backgrounds.
Interestingly, the song also includes Hang Tuah, a well-known Malay
admiral of the Malacca sultanate on the Peninsular side, as one of ‘our people.’
Hang Tuah could have been replaced by another hero from Sabah, for instance,
Albert Kwok, who was the leader of the Kinabalu guerrilla group who fought
against Japanese rule in Sabah in 1943 (Wong 2010: 89). Including a historical
figure of Chinese background such as Kwok would create a more Sabah-centric
image of the people. But it appears that Abu Bakar Ellah seeks to avoid
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restricting ‘our people’ solely to those originating from East Malaysia and the
surrounding region. Choosing Hang Tuah as the third hero (but placing him
on top of the list) indicates that Abu Bakar Ellah does not look upon Peninsular
Malaysia as detracting from the ‘we feeling’ in Sabah. At the same time, by
putting Mat Salleh, Antanom and Hang Tuah together, the song suggests to
the people of Sabah that they should be proud of their ancestors and heroes
as much as the people of Peninsular Malaysia are proud of Hang Tuah, and
that Sabah is as rich in history as Peninsular Malaysia. By ‘remember[ing] our
origins’ this way, the song opens up for Sabahans the world beyond Sabah.
How can the people of Sabah simultaneously put in practice the seemingly
contradictory ideas of remembering their origins and embracing the world
beyond Sabah? The final part of the song explains:
Sifat rendah diri To keep a humble attitude
Hormat-menghormati To pay respect to each other
Berbudi pekerti And to be well disciplined
Adalah . . . That is
Orang kita Our people
Pura-pura lupa To pretend to forget
Suka angan-angan Like to dream
Lupa asal-usul And to forget one’s origins
Adalah . . . That is
Orang kita Our people
The song suggests that apart from remembering their origins, Sabahans
should also ‘forget’ them – not with mindless abandon but strategically, with
humility, self-discipline and out of respect for others. ‘Forgetting’ is an act
that seeks to include others as part of ‘our people’, as well as one that seeks
to diffuse antagonisms that are often sparked when too much is invested in
‘origins’ as a category of inclusion/exclusion.
Conclusion
To conclude, we have seen the ways in which Abu Bakar Ellah suggests in
his telemovies that a Sabahan identity can be fostered without being ‘anti-’
anything. This notion of ‘being-together’, while diametrically opposite to 
the racial practice in West Malaysia, has not led to the formation of a political
movement and there is no guarantee that it will. Nonetheless, for the present,
it serves as an interesting case study of identity formation in the age of 
global population migration, and of a potentially emergent future for contem -
porary Sabah at crossroads. A Sabahan bangsa that is on par with the three
bangsa from West Malaysia may yet crystallize to serve as a guide for the
latter to rethink the constitution of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in a world of irreducible
plurality.
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Notes
1 On Kadazan leaders from the inland district of Tambunan, see Yamamoto (2002).
2 PTI departs radically from films emerging from Peninsular Malaysia that deal with
cross-ethnic and cross-religion romance, such as Anak Sarawak (Son of Sarawak,
1988, directed by Rahim Razali), Spinning Gasing (Spinning Top, 2001, directed
by Teck Tan) and Sepet (Slit Eyes, 2005, directed by Yasmin Ahmad). In these
Peninsular love stories between Muslim and non-Muslim, either the non-Muslim
converts to Islam in order to marry their Muslim partner or they break up because
the conversion is not an option for the non-Muslim partner.
3 The man’s true name was Ontoros Antanom. He should be called Ontoros instead
of Antanom, his father’s name, but as the person is referred to as Antanom in
English documents and is widely known to the people of Sabah, the conventional
name is used to address him.
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